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 Abstract 
The concepts of substantive beliefs and derived beliefs are defined, a set of substantive beliefs S like open 
set and the neighbourhood of an element substantive belief.  A semantic operation of conjunction is 
defined with a structure of an Abelian group. Mathematical structures exist such as poset beliefs and join-
semilattttice beliefs.  A metric space of beliefs and the distance of belief depending on the believer are 
defined.  The concepts of closed and opened ball are defined. S' is defined as subgroup of the metric 
space of beliefs Σ and S' is a totally limited set.  The term s is defined (substantive belief) in terms of 
closing of S.'   It is deduced that Σ is paracompact due to Stone’s Theorem.  The pseudometric space of 
beliefs is defined to show how the metric of the nonbelieving subject has a topological space like  a 
nonmaterial abstract ideal space formed in the mind of the believing subject, fulfilling the conditions of 
Kuratowski axioms of closure. In order to establish patterns of materialization of beliefs we are going to 
consider that these have defined mathematical structures. This will allow us to understand better cultural 
processes of text, architecture, norms, and education that are forms or the materialization of an ideology. 
This materialization is the conversion by means of certain mathematical correspondences, of an abstract 
set whose elements are beliefs or ideas, in an impure set whose elements are material or energetic.  Text is 
a materialization of ideology.  
 
Keywords: Belief materialization, Belief system, Connotative significance, Derived beliefs, Structurating 
structure, Substantive beliefs. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
We know that the human being is a social animal.  This is a common fact.  Moreover, 
the human being is defined as a rational being. It is clear and nobody can deny that 
human creations include logic, mathematics, philosophy, science, and jurisprudence. 
These are all products of rationality or abstract thought. Nevertheless, human sociability 
goes further that the sociability of an animal herd. Societies were founded, cohere, 
develop, degenerate and die based on their belief systems. 
Reason cannot prove the beliefs it is based upon. Beliefs arise through experience. 
Experience need previous beliefs and reason to be assimilated, and reason needs 
experience to be formed, as beliefs need reason as well. Beliefs, reason and experience, 
are based upon each other. Context is dynamic, and formed upon beliefs, reason and 
experience. This where relative understanding lies. Since relative understanding is  
independent of our context, it is also dependant on our beliefs, reasoning, and 
experiences. Contexts are dynamic because they are changing constantly as we have 
new experiences and change our beliefs and our ways of reasoning. Belief systems 
(Borhek and Curtis, 1983) are structures of norms that are interrelated and that vary 
mainly in the degree in which they are systemic.  What is systemic in the Belief system 
is the interrelation between several beliefs.   
Perceived Reality is constructed by means of systems of signs, being affected and being 
changed by means of Belief systems. Peirce (1958) demonstrates that the semiotic 
process has been half-full culturally, that is to say, within a certain Belief system. A 
subject cannot understand a sign without talking about to a system that is learned 
socially and that allows him to make sense of perception.  In the same way, the 
classification of signs in closed typologies can be deceptive, since the status of the sign 
depends strongly on the form in which the sign is used within the Belief system. A 
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significant can nevertheless be iconic in a belief context and, to be symbolic in another 
context.   
Moreover, these signs are not rational. The species Homo sapiens developed so-called 
belief systems. These are sets of beliefs reinforced by culture, theology, experience and 
training as to how the world works, cultural values, stereotypes, political viewpoints, 
etc. In agreement with the Spanish philosopher Ortega y Gasset "in beliefs we live, we 
move and we are [... ] the beliefs constitute the base of our life, the land on which we 
live [... ] All our conduct, including the intellectual life, depends on the system of our 
authentic beliefs. In them [... ] lies latent, as implications of whatever specifically we do 
or we think [... ] the man, at heart, is believing or, which is equal, the deepest stratum of 
our life, the spirit that maintains and carries all the others, is formed by beliefs..”. 
Beliefs are often considered as convictions or as religious beliefs, but as scientists, there 
are also philosophical beliefs relating to the sphere of daily life.  If a stimulus is 
received, it may be interpreted through the belief system to be whatever the belief 
system might lead the recipient to rationalize. A belief system need have no basis in 
reality so long as it consistently provides adequate explanations. It takes us to define a 
human being like Homo religious.  
Claude Levi-Strauss (1963) argued that structural factors determine our cultural 
expressions so as to make them resonate with us beneath awareness. His explanatory 
strategy first involved reducing expressive objects (e.g., artwork or mythological 
stories) to contrastive structures in which some elements were opposed to others. These 
structures were then argued to be similar in form to (or otherwise influenced by) an 
abstract picture of the social structure in which they were produced. The formal 
correspondence produced a resonance that explained why particular expressive objects 
were enjoyed and repetitively interpreted elements. Substantively, Levi-Strauss 
followed Durkheim’s suggestion in The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life 
(Durkheim, 2001) and in Primitive Classification (Durkheim and Mauss, 1963) that 
certain cognitive constructs have the same form as elements of social life. Levi-Strauss 
argued that ‘‘savage minds’’ employed different principles in constructing myths from 
those we use in stories – ones that were entirely novel and heretofore unimagined. In his 
decoding of myths, the reduction to contrastive structures was retained, but the 
explanation of their pattern took a path similar to the generative grammar being 
formulated in linguistics by Noam Chomsky, looking to features of the human brain 
rather than social structure. 
There is no consensus in the literature about the logical form of a belief system 
(Andreas, 2011). In fact, few attempts have been made to characterize belief bases by 
formal, logical means. Rott (2001) and Hansson (1999) introduce the notion of a belief 
system such that it contains only non-derived beliefs. A sentence - is thus an element of 
the belief base H if and only if – it is non-derived and accepted. The investigation of 
base revisions with the intent of an axiomatic characterization with postulates has been 
proposed by Hansson. A belief base H may be joined with a set E of axioms belonging 
to some background theory. This strategy has been studied by Rott (2001) and Brewka 
(1991) in a systematic way. There, the axioms of background theories need only be 
defeasibly valid1. They are simply called expectations, which give rise to the use of E as 
the symbol for the set of axioms of potentially relevant background theories. Rott’s  
 
                                                          
1
 Defeasibly valid means an argument is rationally compelling but not deductively valid. 
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investigation of base revisions in the context of expectations will prove highly useful for 
the present attempt at an integration of the structuralist framework into belief revision 
theory 
 
1.1. Mythical and religious beliefs 
 
Man has lived in two environments: one natural and the other supernatural (Swanson, 
1964). The structures of both worlds vary greatly in human experience. In the words of 
the author- towards man, the supernatural may be indifferent, spiteful, wantonly 
malevolent, supportive, supervisory, distant, intimate, transcendent, or immanent. 
Toward the supernatural -  man may be scornful, friendly, fearful, awe-struck, 
manipulative, indifferent, submissive, reverent, joyful, aggressive, or loving.  
No procedure of empirical science allows us to determine with absolute certainty that an 
event A is the cause of other event B. What one can sometimes show is that B always 
appears after A and that B appears only when A is present. We can never be certain that 
A and B will have this relationship under all possible conditions because we are able to 
study them in only a limited number of situations. We can never be certain that it is A, 
as such, rather than some aspect of  A or something which always accompanies A 
without being a part  of it, which is the necessary and sufficient antecedent of B. The 
confidence that A is the case of B is increased by several factors: 
 
1) There is causal relation if we have some logically valid reasons for thinking that 
it should. 
2) If the relationship appears under a wide variety of conditions. 
3) If alternative explanations may be discarded as contrary to empirical 
observations. 
4) If we are able to control the appearance of antecedent conditions other than A so 
that A alone seems to precede B.  
 
Although absolute empirical proof of any positive assertion about causality is out of the 
question, absolute empirical disproof is often quite possible: B appears in the absence of 
A or A is not always followed by B. It is a curious fact of human nature that we can be 
absolutely certain that something is not true, but only more  or less certain that 
something is true (Swanson, 1964). Two theories have been formulated for the 
explanation of the origin of beliefs: 
 
1) The experiences and inferences of prehistoric men. Knowledge about beliefs 
shows that they do not persist by themselves. An idea, attitude or belief must 
correspond to current experiences with the environment if it is to continue across 
the generations. As the result, we may expect that forces which produce and 
support current beliefs are present along with those beliefs.  
 
2) Direct experiences with Mana2 and spirits. By definition, these supernatural 
entities stand apart from the natural universe, freed of its laws and limitations 
and we are not able to observe them through the instruments of nature.  Behind 
nature events lies the supernatural, that it to say, a realm of potentialities and 
purposes of which natural events are concretions or expressions in the same way 
                                                          
2
 Mana are elemental spirits 
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as human behaviors are expressions of potentialities and purposes held by the 
men who produces them. Mana represents the potentialities which underlie 
nature and spirits represent organized clusters of the underlying purposes 
(Swanson, 1964). When he is confined to the world of nature, man is unable to 
produce what he wants merely by having the desire to do so, by informing the 
natural order with his purposes. He must create changes in the material universe 
which, of themselves, produce yet other changes until his objective is reached. 
At no point do his ideas or purposes intervene to change the environment. They 
must be implemented by material action in the material world or that world 
remains as it was. Supernatural forces are free of these limitations imposed on 
natural action in the material world. Not only does supernatural force have 
powers not given to men, but, unless opposed by other and stronger spirits or by 
magic, the ends toward which those forces are directed are always 
accomplished. The supernatural powers are immortal. They neither die nor 
become impotent with age. Possibly the mystery of death leads to the first belief: 
the existence of a immortal spirit, in the man and other living beings.  The nature 
of life, of sleep, of death, and of dreams was the stuff which inspired religious 
thought. Reflecting on these mysteries, man developed the distinction between 
the human body and the spirit dwelling within it.  
 
By symbols Geertz (1973) meant a carrier embodying a conception as he saw religion 
and culture as systems of communication. Eliade (1978) suggested that the earliest 
document in the history of beliefs is located in the symbolism of stone tools or tool 
making. For Harrod (1992) the first technological discoveries not only insured the 
survival and development of the human species: they also produced a universe of 
mythical-religious values and inspired and fed the creative imagination. Human 
religious thought and moral values clearly rest on a cognitive-linguistic base. 
Fundamental to humanity, as inseparable as language, is the common origin of religion 
and art. Even in primitive less figurative art works and more clearly in art with religious 
content, the primitive artist is the creator of a message; he exerts through the forms a 
symbolized function that is also evident in music, dance and language.  This message 
indicates the physical and psychic necessity to provide to the individual and the social 
group the importance of understanding the universe. To provide a place for man, by 
means of the symbolic apparatus, in the movable and random world that surrounds him. 
One suggestion has the gods representing the sun and the goddesses the moon. Another 
would have us see gods personifying a life-force causing plants, especially the food-
plants, to grow anew each spring (Walsby, 1947). These proposed explanations, and 
others attempting to trace the origins of the divinities in nature, do much to account for 
the pattern of the rise, the decline and the renascence so common in religious myths, 
and for the emotions associated with religion. But although sun, moon and stars 
undeniably play a part, they serve less as an origin of  the religious impulse as a way of 
providing it with a local habitation. Cows and cats also have provided shapes for 
divinity to occupy, but few propose these creatures have a role as a source of religious 
belief. There is more to religion than these explanations can explain, and - what 
concerns us here - they fall short of accounting for the omnipotence credited to the 
supreme deities. 
Geertz (1973) saw religion as one of the cultural systems of a society. He defined 
religion as a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive and long-
lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of 
existence and  clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods 
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and motivations seem uniquely realistic. The concept Religion is sometimes used 
interchangeably with that of belief system, but it is more socially defined than personal 
convictions, and it entails specific behaviors. Nevertheless belief systems may not 
necessarily refer to a religion, though a religion may be referred to as a belief system. 
Religion is a system of human thought which usually includes a set of narratives, 
symbols, beliefs and practices that give meaning to the practitioner's experiences of life 
through reference to a higher power or ultimate truth.  
Religion may focus on specific supernatural, metaphysical, and moral claims about 
Reality which may yield a set of deontical norms, values, and a particular lifestyle. 
Religion as we know it today is an integral part of civilization, influential, immensely 
complex and deeply enmeshed in social life. Political movements turn out on 
examination to form a significant series and one might have expected religions to fall 
into a corresponding distribution, but they do not.  Religion symbolizes the strength and 
cohesiveness of society, but no society, simple or sophisticated, provides any model for 
unlimited power; every society acts within limitations imposed either by the natural 
world or by other societies. Religious behavior, the religiosity, is not made up only of 
religion, but that it supposes, everything in a set of physiological and psychological 
facts that generate an emotional field in which the rational explanation does not occupy 
the primary position. 
 
1.2. Initial hypotheses 
Considered these arguments we propose following initial hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Beliefs are not products of reason or of abstract and logical thought.   
 
Hypothesis 2: In the origin of any belief system there is always a supernatural system 
of beliefs.   
 
Hypothesis 3: Derived beliefs become substantial beliefs with the passage of time, 
giving origin to a more or less ample body of substantive beliefs, that is to say, a 
religion.   
 
Hypothesis 4: When belonging to the Ideological Doxical Superstructure (Nescolarde-
Selva and Usó-Domènech. 2013a,b,c,  Usó-Domènech  and Nescolarde-Selva, 2012), the 
set S of substantive beliefs will be "ideal”, that is to say, merely abstract.  
 
Hypothesis 5: Substantive and derived sets form a graphed text having a topological 
structure which represents the way in which the individual organizes semantic content, 
concepts and propositions in his cognitive structure through subsumption, 
differentiation and integration. 
 
2. SUBSTANTIVE AND DERIVED BELIEFS 
A belief system (BS) is a set of related ideas, learned and shared which has some 
permanence in time and space, and to which individuals and/or groups exhibits some 
commitment (Borhek and Curtis, 1983; Usó-Doménech and Nescolarde-Selva, 2012). 
The conditions of permanence, commitment, and connectedness are variable 
characteristics through which we expect belief systems to be related to social 
organization.  Any belief system will be formed by two essential levels:  
 
1) Ideal or abstract level.  
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2) Material level or text.  
 
The first of the levels or the abstract level of the BS it is the reason for this work. It is 
embedded in the individual mind and has been acquired by means of a physical 
transmission, either oral or visual, through a textual materialization, such as a written, 
pictorial, architectural, musical, etc, text.  We may in fact affirm that a belief system 
operates as a cybernetic feedback process (Figure 1).   
 
(learning)
IDEAL OR ABSTRACT LEVEL
PHYSICAL 
LEVEL
SUBJECT
MATERIALIZATION
PROCESS
TRANSMISSION PROCESS
REALITY
PERCEPTION
MEANING OF PERCEPTION
 
Figure 1: Belief system as a cybernetic feedback process.  
 
Definition 1: The abstract belief level (BS) is formed by a set of elements denominated 
substantive beliefs S forming the unquestionable truths of the system (axioms) and a set 
of derived beliefs D, formed from substantive beliefs. 
 
Substantive beliefs constitute the axioms of the system, while many of derived beliefs 
will constitute their theorems.  
 
Example 1: In the same sense as Christianity or Islam, Judaism, cannot be credited with 
the possession of Articles of Faith. Many attempts have indeed been made at 
systematizing and reducing to a fixed phraseology and sequence the contents of the 
Jewish religion (Scholem, 1941). However, these have always lacked one essential 
element: authoritative sanction on the part of a supreme ecclesiastical body. In addition, 
for this reason they have not been recognized as final or regarded as having universally 
binding force. However, to a certain extent incorporated in the liturgy and utilized for 
purposes of instruction, these formulations of the cardinal tenets of Judaism carried no 
greater weight than that imparted to them by the fa
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respective authors. None of them had a character analogous to that given in the Church 
to its three great formulas (the so-called Apostles' Creed, the Nicene or 
Constantopolitan Creed, and the Athanasian Creed), or even to the Kalimat AsShahadat 
of the Muslims. None of the many summaries from the pens of Jewish philosophers and 
rabbis have been invested with similar importance and prominence. The reasons for this 
relative absence of official and obligatory creeds are easily ascertained. The most 
widely spread and popular of all creeds is that of Maimonides, embracing the thirteen 
articles. Why he chose this particular number has been a subject of much discussion. 
Some have seen in the number a reference to the thirteen attributes of God. Probably the 
choice of the number has no significance. His articles are:  
 
s1 Principle I: To know the existence of the Creator. 
s2 Principle II: The unity of God.  
s3 Principle III: The denial of physicality in connection with God.  
s4 Principle IV: God’s Antiquity.  
s5 Principle V: That God, blessed be He, is worthy that we serve Him, to 
                        Glorify Him, to make known His greatness, and to do His 
                        Commands. 
 s6 Principle VI: Prophecy. 
s7 Principle VII: The prophetic capacity of Moses our Teacher, peace be 
                            upon him. 
s8 Principle VIII: That the Torah is from heaven [God]. 
s9 Principle IX: The completeness of the Torah.  
s10 Principle X: That God knows man’s actions and does not remove His 
                           eye from them.  
 s11 Principle XI: That God gives reward to he who does the 
                            commandments of the Torah and punishes those that 
                           transgress its admonishments and warnings. 
s12 Principle XII: The era of the Messiah.  
 s13 Principle XIII: Resurrection of the dead.  
*** 
 
In the section are exposed the main elementary mathematical structures (Usó-Doménech 
and Nescolarde-Selva, 2012). 
Let { }nsssS ,...,, 21=  be the set of substantive beliefs and { }mdddD ,...,, 21=  the set of 
derived beliefs, such that { }mn dddsssDSBS ,...,,,,...,, 2121== ∪ . There is the no belief 
or empty belief that we will represent by∅ . Set BS forms a belief sequence because it is 
an ordered list of objects. It contains terms or beliefs, and the number of terms is called 
the length of the sequence. Order matters, and the exact same terms can appear multiple 
times at different positions in the belief sequence. BS forms a finite sequence with terms 
in the set BS because it is a function from { }mn dddsss ,...,,,,...,, 2121  to BS.  
Due to the complexity of the belief systems, we have thought that it is advisable to limit 
this approach to the study of the set of substantive beliefs S, avoiding the derived beliefs 
D (Usó-Doménech and Nescolarde-Selva, 2012). Mathematical structures of beliefs are 
based on Klüver (2011), Anderson (1987), Birkhoff (1967), Bourbaki (1972), Bryant 
(1985), Burris and Sankappanavar (1981), Kelley (1955) and Willard (1970).  
 
2.1. Set characteristics 
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Let { }ni ssssS ,...,,..,, 21=  be a set of substantives beliefs3. Set S has the following 
characteristics:  
 
1) The set S is a countable set because there exists an injective function NSf →:  
being N the natural numbers. 
2) The set S is bounded because it has both upper and lower bounds.  
3) In all sets of substantive beliefs S there exists one substantive term which we 
will consider as the main term.   
 
Example 2: The Maimonides’ Creed has a longitude of 13.  
The main term is s1 = To know the existence of the Creator. 
Term s5 Principle V: That God, blessed be He, is worthy that we serve Him, to glorify 
Him, to make known His greatness, and to do His commands. Can be placed in 
subsentences or subterms: 
s51= ε1 = That God 
s52 = ε2 = blessed be He 
s53 = ε3 = is worthy that we serve Him 
s54 = ε4 = to glorify Him 
s55 = ε5 = to make known His greatness 
s56 = ε6 = and to do His commands. 
*** 
Let L be a language. We suppose the existence of n substantive beliefs nsss ,...,, 21  
coexisting at a certain historical moment. Let ב be the set of all substantive beliefs such 
that ב={ }1 2, ,......., ,.....ns s s . Let ε be a sentence such that ∈∈ ii ss ,ε  ב. Let be (+) the 
operation of adding a sentence and (- ) the operation of clearing a sentence. Then 
 
Definition 2: A set of substantive beliefs S  ב is called open, if for each s S there 
exists and ∅≠ε  such that the interval ( s - , s + ) is contained in S.  
 
Definition 3: A set S of substantive beliefs is called closed if the complement of S, BS \ 
S, is open.  
 
Closed sets S correspond to belief systems ideologically closed and impermeable, such 
as dogmatic religions or political totalitarian ideologies. 
 
Definition 4: In an open S interval, ( s - , s + ) is called a neighborhood of term s.  
 
Let nsssS ,...,, 21=  be a collection of substantive beliefs (axioms). We define the 
operation ∧
sem
 or semantic conjunction. We define the following properties:   
 
                                                          
3
 Over time, some derived beliefs become substantive beliefs. At the same time, some substantive beliefs 
change their order in the set of substantive beliefs or simply disappear. This indicates the existence of a 
dynamic within this set. 
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1) For the believer, each substantive belief will have a truth value equal to 1, 
( ) 1=sv .   
2) There is the absolute negation of a substantive belief is¬ with truth value equal 
to 0 ( ) 0=¬ isv .   
3) The semantic conjunction between two or more substantive beliefs will have a 
truth value equal to 1 121 =





∧ ssv
sem
.   
4) An empty substantive belief exists∅ .   
 
The pair 





∧
sem
S , has the following properties:  
1) Closure:  Sss ∈∀ 21 , , SSS
sem
∈





∧ 21  
2) Associativity: ,,, 321 Ssss ∈∀  





=





∧∧∧∧ 321321 ssssss
semsemsemsem
 
3) Identity element: { },/ ii ssS ∈∀∈∃∅  i
sem
ii
sem
sss =∅=∅ ∧∧ . 
4) Inverse element: ∅=¬=¬∈∃¬∈∀ ∧∧ i
sem
ii
sem
iii ssssSsSs /,  
5) Commutativity: 122121 /, ssssSss
semsem
∧∧ =∈∀  
Therefore 





∧
sem
S ,  is an abelian group. For the case of a believer, the identity element 
and inverse element suppose processes of conversion or abandonment of the belief 
respectively. 
 
2.2. The poset belief  
In a set of substantive beliefs S exist a partial order relation ≥  or “priority relation” 
which is: 
 
1) Reflexive: 11 ss ≥ . 
2) Antisymmetric: If 21 ss ≥  and 12 ss ≥  then 21 ss = . 
3) Transitive: If 21 ss ≥  and 32 ss ≥  then 31 ss ≥ . 
4) Totality: 122121 ,, ssssSss ≥∨≥∈∀  
 
In other words, a priority order over S is an antisymmetric preorder, having the 
following characteristics: 
1) The number of terms of S is finite. Therefore when ( )≥,S  a finite partial order 
relation or belief poset.  
2) Let s1, s2,s3 be three terms of (S, ≥ ) such that 321 sss ≥≥ . The element 1s  is the 
belief term join, supremum belief or least upper belief bound of S if the 
following conditions are satisfied: 
 
a) 21 ss ≥  and 32 ss ≥ . 
b) Ssss lji ∈∀ ,, such that iss ≥1 and jss ≥1 we have lss ≥1 . 
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Consequence 1: The set S is a directed set because it has together with a reflexive and 
transitive binary relation ≥ , with the additional property that every pair of elements has 
an upper bound.  
 
Note 1: The supremum belief is the main term of the set of substantive beliefs. 
 
Note 2: The supremum belief is the greatest element of the belief poset. 
 
Condition 1: ( )≥,S  has always a belief term join or supremum belief.  
 
2.3. The belief term join-semilattice 
As the belief term join does always exist, it is denoted ji ss ∨ . If all pairs of terms of S 
have belief term joins, then indeed the belief term join is a binary operation on S, and it 
is easy to see that this operation fulfils the following three conditions: For any terms 
321 ,, sss in S: 
 
A1) Commutativity: 1221 ssss ∨=∨ . 
A2) Associativity: ( ) ( ) 321221 ssssss ∨∨=∨∨ . 
A3) Idempotence: 111 sss =∨ . 
.  
In a set of substantive beliefs S with a partial order priority relation (belief poset), the 
belief term join is unique. We suppose that *11 , ss  are both belief term joins of S. Then 
1
*
11 sss ≥≥  whence indeed *11 ss = . And a set S of substantive beliefs is a closed set, not 
allowing the existence of more terms. If another term as *1s existed it would be a 
different substantive belief set, which is not allowed by the same definition of 
substantive belief set.   
 
Definition 5:  The binary priority operation ≥  on a substantive belief set S is a belief 
term join, if it satisfies the three conditions A1, A2, and A3 supra and the pair ( )≥,S  
then is a belief join-semilattice.  
 
2.4. The belief term meet-semilattice 
Let S be a substantive belief set with a partial priority order ≥ , and let si and sj be two 
terms in S. A term sn of S is the belief term meet or infimum belief  of si and sj, if the 
following two conditions are satisfied: 
1) ni ss ≥  and nj ss ≥ . 
 2) for any 1+ns in S, such that 1+≥ ni ss and we have 1+≥ nj ss .  
 
A belief term meet of si and sj is unique, since if both sn and sn' are greatest lower 
bounds of si and sj, then nnn sss ≥≥ ' , whence indeed 'nn ss = .  
 
Note 3: A belief term meet will exist not always in a belief poset. 
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If the belief term meet does exist, it is denoted ji ss ∧ . If all pairs of terms have belief 
term meets, then indeed the belief term meet is a binary operation on S. For any 
elements Ssss ∈321 ,,  this operation fulfils the following three conditions: 
 
B1) Commutativity: 1221 ssss ∧=∧ . 
B2) 12 ss ≥  Associativity: ( ) ( ) 321221 ssssss ∧∧=∧∧ . 
B3) Idempotence: 111 sss =∧ . 
 
We then may define a binary priority relation on S, by stating that 21 ss ≥ if 112 sss =∨ . 
In fact, this relation is a partial order on S. Indeed, for any elements 321 ,, sss  in S: 
C1) 11 ss ≥ , since 111 sss =∨  by A3. 
C2) If 21 ss ≥  and 12 ss ≥ , then 221121 ssssss =∨=∨=  by A1. 
C3)If 32 ss ≥  and 21 ss ≥  then 31 ss ≥ , since then 
( ) ( ) 11212312313 sssssssssss =∨=∨∨=∨∨=∨  by A2. 
 
Definition 6:  The binary priority operation ≥  on a substantive belief set S is a belief 
term meet, if it satisfies the three conditions C1, C2, and C3 supra and the pair ( )≥,S  
then is a belief meet-semilattice.  
 
2.5. The belief term complete lattice 
For our intentions we will establish the following condition:   
 
Condition 2: The set S will be a finite set.   
 
Consequence 2: Set S has a supremum belief s1 and an infimum belief sn.  
 
Consequence 3: All subset of S also will be finite and has a supremum and an infimum 
belief.   
 
Let si and sj be two terms of (S, ≥ ) and S’ a subset of S.  
 
Definition 7: If for all elements si and sj, if si is more than or equal to sj and sj is an 
element of S’, then s1 is also in S’: [ ]'' SsSsssss ijjiji ∈⇒∈∧≥∀∀  then S’ is the 
lower belief set or belief downward closed. 
Let Ssss lji ∈,,  be three terms of a belief poset ( )≥,S  and so that { } SsssS lji ⊂= ,,' .  
 
Definition 8: The subset S’ of a belief poset ( )≥,S  is called a directed belief subset if 
S’is not the empty set, and for any sj and sl in S’ there exists a si in S’ with ji ss ≥  and 
lj ss ≥ . 
 
Consequence 4: All belief subset S’ is directed.  
 
Definition 9: The belief subset S’ is a proper belief ideal, if the following conditions 
hold: 
1) S’ is a lower belief set: ',' SsssSs jjii ∈⇒≥∈∀ . 
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2) S’ is a directed belief set. 
 
Definition 10: A belief ideal is a complete belief ideal if it is equal to the whole belief 
substantive set S.  
 
Definition 11: The smallest belief ideal containing the supremum belief s1 is a principal 
belief ideal and s1 is said to be a principal term of the belief ideal in this situation. The 
principal belief ideal for a principal term s1 is just given by the set { }ii ssSs ≥∈ 1 . 
 
Definition 12: A non-empty belief subset S’’ of a belief poset ( )≥,S  is a proper belief 
filter if the following conditions hold: 
1) S’’ is a belief filter base: For every si, sj in S’’, there is some element sl in S’’, 
such that li ss ≥ and lj ss ≥ .  
2) S’’ is a belief upper set: For every si in S’’ and sj in S, ij ss ≥ implies that sj is in 
S’’.  
 
Definition 13: A belief filter is a complete belief filter if it is equal to the whole belief 
substantive set S.  
 
Definition 14: The smallest belief filter that contains an infimum belief sn is a principal 
belief filter and sn is a principal term in this situation. The principal belief filter for sn is 
just given by the set{ }njj ssSx ≥∈ . 
 
Definition 15: A belief poset ( )≥,S  is a complete poset because each of its beliefs 
subsets are directed (consequence 3) and has a belief supremum and a belief infimum.  
 
An order in which all finite sets have both a supremum and an infimum is a lattice. In 
our case it will be a belief lattice. 
Let us suppose a subset S’ of the belief poset (S, ≥ ) of substantive beliefs with a priority 
relation. A belief join of S’ is a term of S which is greater than or equal to every element 
of S’. Formally, the belief meet of a subset S’ of the belief poset is an element sn of S 
such that 
 
1) ni ssSs ≥∈∀ 1,' . 
2) Ss j ∈∀  if ,,' jii ssSs ≥∈∀ then ni ss ≥ . 
 
Definition 16: A belief subset S’ of a belief lattice (S, ≥ ) is a belief ideal iff it is a lower 
belief set that is closed under finite belief joins.  
 
Definition 17: A belief subset S’ of a belief lattice (S, ≥ ) is a belief filter, iff it is an 
upper belief set that is closed under finite belief meets.  
 
S is said to satisfy the descending chain condition because every descending chain 
nssss ≥≥≥≥ ...321 of elements of S there exists a positive integer n such that 
...21 === ++ nnn sss ,there is no infinite descending chain.  
 
Minimal condition: Every nonempty belief subset of S has a minimal term.  
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All chains have also a supremum belief. Therefore the belief lattice (S, ≥ ) will be ω-
complete. 
 
Consequence 5: The belief lattice (S, ≥ )is a complete lattice.  
 
Consequence.6: The belief lattice (S, ≥ ) fulfills the conditions of strong completeness.  
 
2.6. Belief uniformity 
Let { }nsssS ,...,, 21=  be the set of substantive beliefs and SXS  be its Cartesian 
product. Let Θ be a nonempty family of subsets of the Cartesian product 
SXS⊆Θ called the uniform structure or belief uniformity of S  and let U be a set so 
that .Θ∈U   
 
Definition 18: The elements of Θ are called b-entourages satisfying the following 
axioms: 
1) Axiom 10: If U is in Θ , then U contains the diagonal ( ){ }Ssss iii ∈=∆ :, . Each 
term is U-close to itself for each b-entourage U. 
2) Axiom 11: If U is in Θ  and V is a subset of SXS which contains U, then V is in 
Θ . 
3) Axiom 12: If U and V are in Θ , then U ∩ V is in Θ . Being both U-close and V-
close is also a closeness relation in the uniformity. 
4) Axiom 13: If U is in Θ , then there exists V in Θ  such that, whenever 
( ) ( )3221 ,,, ssss  are in V, then ( )31 , ss  is in U. For each b-entourage U there is a 
b-entourage V which is half as large. 
5) Axiom 14: If U is in Θ , then ( ) ( )






=
− UinssssU 2112
1
,:, is also in Θ . It 
states the essentially symmetric property "closeness" with respect to a uniform 
structure. 
 
It is easy to verify that the space (S, Θ ) fulfills the previous axioms.  
 
Definition 19: We define 21 , ss  as U-close if ( ) Uss ∈21 , .  
The b-entourage U is symmetric because ( ) Uss ∈21 ,  and ( ) Uss ∈12 , . Every uniform 
belief space has a fundamental system of b-entourages consisting of symmetric b-
entourages. 
Let 
 
{ } { } { } { } { } { } { } { }
SSSSSSSS
sssssssssss
nnno
nnnn
,...,,...,,...,,,...,,,
,...,,,....,,,...,,,...,,,,...,,,
)1(120121
21121121
−
−
=∅∅
  
be a collection of sets whose elements are substantive beliefs.  
 
Definition 20: As ∪
A
SS
∈
⊂
α
α  we say that { }ASC ∈= αα :  is a belief cover of S.  
Let C and D be two belief covers of S. If every set in D is contained in some set in D we 
say that cover D is a refinement of belief cover C. 
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Definition 21:  JjVD ∈=  is a refinement of IiUC ∈= if ij∃∀ so that ij UV ⊆ . 
 
2.7. Metric Belief Space 
Let { }nsssS ,...,, 21=  be the set of substantive beliefs. A metric on a set S is a function 
called the belief distance and so that ℜ→SxS:δ  where ℜ is the set of real numbers.  
 
Note 4: Belief distance δ is subjective and it depends on  the believer. 
 
Therefore metric δ will be a belief metric (b-metric). 
For all 321 ,, sss  in S, this function is required to satisfy the following conditions: 
1) Non-negativity: ( ) 0, 21 ≥ssδ   
2) Identity of indiscernibles: ( ) 0, 21 =ssδ    iff 21 ss =   
3) Symmetry: ( ) ( )1221 ,, ssss δδ =  
4) Triangle inequality: ( ) ( ) ( )322131 ,,, ssssss δδδ +≤   
 
Therefore, we may define S like a metric belief space iff the believer subject defines a 
belief distance which will be always subjective. 
 
Definition 22:  The ordered pair ( )δ,S=Σ is a metric belief space.  
1) ( ) 0,,, 212 =∈∀ ssSss i δ  iff   21 ss =  
2) ( ) ( ) ( )32213132 ,,,,,, ssssssSsss i δδδ +≤∈∀   
In a metric belief space  
 ( )
( )






=
==
otherwisess
ssifss
ji
jiji
1,
0,
δ
δ
 
 
Therefore, the metric belief space Σ = (S,δ) has a discrete b-metric. This, in particular, 
shows that for any substantive belief set S, there is always a metric belief space 
associated to it. Using this b-metric, any term is an open ball, and therefore every 
substantive belief subset SS i ⊆  is open and the metric belief space (S, δ) has a discrete 
belief topology.  
Let 21 , ss be two terms so that Sss ∈21 , and let r be a radius so that .0, >ℜ∈ rr   
 
Definition 23: We define an open ball of radius r > 0 centered at a term 2s  in S, 
to ( ) ( ){ }rssMssBr <∈=∇ 2112 ,δ  
 
Definition 24: We define a closed ball of radius r > 0 centered at a term 2s  in S, 
to ( ) ( ){ }rssMssBr ≤∈=∇ 2112 ,δ  
 
Note 5: In any set of substantive beliefs S any subject can make or construct as many 
open as closed balls.   
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Note 6: By the peculiar characteristics of S, the balls will always be referred to term s1 
considered as the main term or supremum belief.   
 
Let S’ be a subset of a metric belief space ( )δ,S=Σ  such that SS ⊆' and E be a size. 
 
Definition 25: We say that S’ is bounded if there exists an 1s in S and r > 0 such that 
for all si in ΣS , we have ( ) .,1 rss i <δ . 
 
Σ is a bounded metric belief space because Σ is bounded as a subset of itself. 
 
Definition 26:  A subset S’ of a metric belief space Σ is a totally bounded set iff given 
size E, there exists a natural number n and a family S1, S2, ..., Sn of subsets of S, such 
that ΣS  is contained in the union of the family, and such that each set Si in the family is 
of size E.  
( ) 





≤=∀∧⊆⊆∃∃∀
=
∪
n
i
iin ESsizeniSSSSSSnE
1
21 ,...,1',...,,,,  
Note 7: The metric belief space Σ is a totally bounded belief space iff it is a totally 
bounded belief set when considered as a subset of itself .SS ⊆   
 
Note 8: S is totally bounded if, given any positive radius r > 0, it is covered by finitely 
many balls of radius r. 
 
The absolute value i js s− can be replaced by the belief distance ( )ji ss ,δ  between si 
and sj. It will allow us to establish Cauchy sequences in the metric belief space Σ.  
Given a metric belief space Σ = (S, δ), a belief sequence is Cauchy, if there exists a 
positive real ε > 0 and there is a positive integer N such that for all natural numbers i,j > 
N, the belief distance ( )ji ss ,δ  is less than ε. The terms of the belief sequence are 
getting closer and closer together in a way that suggests that the belief sequence ought 
to have a limit in S.  
In a metric belief space ( )δ,S=Σ , the sets ( ) ( ){ }assSXSssU a <∈= 2121 ,, δ  where a 
> 0 form a fundamental system of b-entourages for the standard uniform structure of S. 
Then s1 and s2 are Ua-close precisely when the distance between s1 and s2 is at most a. 
 
Definition 27: In a metric belief space ( )δ,S=Σ , a set V is an uniform belief 
neighborhood of a term p if there exists an open ball with centre s and radius r, such 
that ( ) ( ){ } ., VrpsdSspBr ⊂<∈=  
We may see in figure 2. 
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r
V
the radius of ball is r
 
Figure 2: Metric belief space. 
 
 
Definition 28: A pseudometric belief space ( )δ,S  is a set S of substantive beliefs 
together with a non-negative real-valued function ℜ→SXS;δ such that, for every 
Ssss ∈321 ,, , 
1) ( ) 0, 11 =ssδ  
2) ( ) ( ) 0,, 1221 == ssss δδ  
3) ( ) ( ) ( )322131 ,,, ssssss δδδ +≤  
 
There is a metric identification, that converts the pseudometric belief space into a full-
fledged metric belief space by defining s1˜s2 if ( ) 0, 21 =ssδ . Let S* = S / ˜ and 
let [ ] [ ]( ) ( )2121 ,,* ssss δδ = . Then *δ  is a belief metric on S * and (S*, *δ ) is a well-
defined metric belief space. Let ℜ→SXSf : be a belief pseudometric on a set of 
substantive beliefs S.  For a family (fi) of belief pseudometrics on S, the uniform 
structure defined by the family is the least upper belief bound of the uniform belief 
structures defined by the individual belief pseudometric fi. The family of belief 
pseudometrics is finite and it can be seen that the same belief uniform structure is 
defined by a single belief pseudometric, namely the upper belief envelope (sup fi ) of the 
family.  
 
2.9. The Topological Belief Space 
The open balls of a metric belief space S form a basis for the topological belief space, 
whose open sets are all possible unions of open balls. This space is called the belief 
topology induced by the metric d. 
Let S be a set of substantive beliefs and Θ be a collection of sets so that 
{ } { } { } { }{ }Sssssss niin ,...,,,....,,,...,, 21∅=Θ . The pair ( )Θ,S  will form a topological 
space because it fulfills the following conditions: 
1) ∅  and S are in Θ.  
2) The union of any collection of sets in Θ is also in Θ.  
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3) The intersection of any finite collection of sets in Θ is also in Θ.  
 
Definition 29: The topological space ( )Θ,S  we call the topological belief space.  
 
Definition 30: The collection Θ is called a belief topology on S and the elements of S 
are called substantive beliefs o terms.  
 
Let )(SP  be the power set of S and 21 ,σσ  be two sets so that )(, 21 SP∈σσ . We 
define the function )()(: XPXPbcl → called the closure belief operator satisfying the 
following Kuratowski closure axioms:   
1) Extensivity: ( )11 σσ bcl⊆  
2) Idempotence: ( )( ) ( )11 σσ bclbclbcl =  
3) Preservation of binary unions: ( ) ( ) ( )2121 σσσσ ∪∪ bclbclbcl =  
4) Preservation of nullary unions: ( ) ∅=∅bcl  
5) Preservation of finitary unions: 
     ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )nn bclbclbclbcl σσσσσσ ∪∪∪∪∪∪ ...... 2121 =  
 
Then a topological belief space can be defined as ( )bclS , . Given a topological belief 
space ( )Θ,S  and a subset SS ⊂' , the belief subspace topology on S’ is defined by 
{ }Θ∈=Θ XXSS ∩'' .  
 
Definition 31: If S’ is equipped with the belief subspace topology then it is a 
topological belief space, and is called a belief subspace of ( )Θ,S .  
 
Let Σ’ and Σ be two belief topologies on a belief set S such that Θ⊆Θ' , that is, every 
element of Θ’ is also an element of Θ. Then the belief topology Θ’ is a coarser belief 
topology than Θ, and Θ is said to be a finer belief topology than Θ’. If Θ≠Θ' , Θ’ is 
strictly coarser than Θ and Θ is strictly finer than Θ’. 
If the set S has a collection of subsets Θ that is a topological belief space then any 
member of Θ is an open set. We call B to topological belief space ( ) ( )bclSSB ,, =Θ= . 
Let B be a topological belief space and Ss ∈  be a term. Let us suppose that VUs ⊆∈ . 
Then the set V will be a belief neighborhood of  term s and s is in the interior of V. The 
collection of neighborhoods of s will form a neighborhood filter ( )sV  of term s. Let V 
be the neighborhood of s and let B a set such that .VB ⊂  There is a neighborhood filter 
)()( sVsB ⊂  such that ).(),( sBBsVV ∈∃∈∀  )(sB  is the local belief base the term s.  
Let S’ be a subset of topological belief space B such that SS ⊂' . The closure of S’ 
consists in all terms (terms) which are close to S’. 
 
Definition 32: A term Bs ∈ is an adherent term for S’ if every open set containing s 
contains at least one term of S’ other than s.  
 
A term s is an adherent term for S’ iff s is in the closure of 'S \{ }s . A term that is not an 
adherent term of S’ is said to be an isolated term of S’. 
 
Definition 33: Term s is a term of closure of S’ if every neighborhood of s contains a 
term of S’.  
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Consequence 7: Substantive beliefs have an abstract or ideal topological structure4. 
 
3. MATERIALIZATION OF BELIEF SYSTEMS 
Materialization is the conversion by means of certain mathematical correspondences, of 
an abstract set whose elements are beliefs or ideas, in an impure set whose elements are 
material or energetic.  In their discussion on the materialization of ideology, DeMarrais 
et al. (1996) focused on understanding how the transformation of ideas, values, stories, 
myths and the like can be materialized into a physical reality that can take the form of 
ceremonial events, symbolic objects, monuments, and writing. The interest in the social 
engagement between people and material culture in ancient societies has resulted in 
numerous publications that seek to revise the original theoretical tenets proposed by 
DeMarrais and her colleagues (DeMarrais et al., 2004), as well as a renewed concern for 
the relationship between objects, social practices and human and non-human agency. 
Cognitive scientists have in fact noticed the importance of unique and unexpected 
events in framing the cognitive schemata of individuals through so-called flashbulb 
memories that concern our recall for the circumstances in which we learned of some 
significant event that, usually, was unexpected (McCauley & Lawson 2002). Thus, 
importance should be given to a materialization of religious beliefs that stimulates the 
senses of the involved agents (Keane, 2008; Meyer, 2008) through the use of cues that 
are part of a system of settings and activities, and thereby give meaning to the built 
environment in which ritual practices are enacted and shared between religious 
specialists and ritual participants (Rapoport, 1990b). According to Rapoport (1988), to 
understand the meaning of a built environment we have to interpret the relationship 
between the cues (i.e., fixed-features, semi-fixed and informal elements) that create a 
system of settings and activities (DeMarrais, 2004). It is the setting, with its sensorial 
aura, that is pivotal to structuring the ideological construct of the society, because it has 
both communicative and mnemonic functions, eliciting appropriate behavior by the 
participants (Rapoport, 1990a). This theoretical framework is based on a nonverbal 
communication system in which all involved elements can be envisioned as nodes 
(Knappett, 2005); through the use of connecting ties (Jones, 2007), the nodes form a 
network that establishes the meanings of the material culture concerned with religious 
practices. The elements involved in the materialization of the network are diverse and 
combine a patchwork of sensorial experiences, i.e. visual, tactual, sound, smell, taste, 
that are interconnected by complex forms of ritual practices shared by the participants 
(Jones, 2007). Through the use of connecting ties (Jones, 2007), the nodes form a 
network that establishes the meanings of the material culture concerned with religious 
practices. For the involved cues to be both functional and meaningful, the context, the 
participants prior knowledge and the social practice involving human and non-human 
elements appear as central for a coherent and powerful construction of the meaning of 
materiality. In a similar way, Bell (1992) affirms that “ritual acts must be understood 
within a semantic framework whereby the significance of an action is dependent upon 
its place and relationship within a context of all other ways of acting: what it echoes, 
what it inverts, what it alludes to, what it denies”. 
                                                          
4For a belief system to have a certain topological structure does not mean a different belief system has the 
same topology. Moreover, within the same belief system, just adding or subtracting a substantive belief 
does not mean that the topology will be different. But the laws of mathematics are always the same, not 
the consequences (materialization). 
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In materialization process, we will distinguish two different although intimately united 
processes:  symbolic materialization and textual materialization. We will divide to the 
Primigenial Base on two parts, PB1 containing the archetypes and PB2 containing myths 
(Figure 3).   
Ideological Doxical 
Superstructure 
 (IDS) 
Values in fact, Dominant Ideology, 
Primigenial Base 
PB1: Archetypes 
PB2: Ideal Values, Myths.
connotative-SB- projection 
(symbolic materialization)
Subject
mythical superstructural 
image (MS-image)
Ideal Structure (ISt) 
  
Ideal Values, abstract ideology 
Utopia (Goals)
doxical superstructural 
image (IDS-image). 
Mythical Superstructure (MS)
last goal
near goal
inverse-MS-image
inverse-MS-projection (concretion)
ACTUAL
IDEAL
Actual Structural Base 
Desirable Structural 
Base
3
connotative-SB- projection 
(textual materialization)
Figure 3: Mechanism for materialization. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
We have sought to demonstrate that beliefs and their textual materialization have each 
topological structures.  Nevertheless, from where do these mathematical structures 
come? In the case of structures of visual materialization the answer seems clear. 
However, it is not so in the world of beliefs and ideas. Unless we accept the philosophy 
of Plato, freeing the world of ideas from the human being, beliefs, both substantive and 
derived have a material origin, inserted in the human brain. This can be considered from 
two aspects:  psychological and linguistic: 
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1) Associated with the topological points is a family of open sets that cover space, 
like the response fields that constitute neighbourhoods of the actual neurons in 
the brain. The key point is that there are certain invariants associated with a 
topology that remain unchanged under the transformations.  In the case of the 
visual field, the transformations are the distortions imposed by viewing 
conditions.  The objects in the visual field are recognized as what they are in 
their own right no matter how their appearance may be distorted by viewing 
conditions:  near or far, right-left, up-or-down in the field of view, rotated, 
moving, or viewed obliquely or binocularly.  In addition, a tune is still 
recognizable even if it is shifted in key or changed in loudness, or heard 
biaurally. These invariance constitute the psychological constancies.  Lacking 
constancy invariance, you would always be moving through a surrealistic world 
of perpetually deforming, rubbery objects.  For the visual system, it is axiomatic 
that an object is determined by its bounding contours, and it is the invariance of 
these under different viewing conditions that determines constancy and form 
memory (Lewin, 1936). This brings us to the blessed domain of Lie 
transformation groups, denoted symbolically by the mapping GTXG → , where 
G is a mathematical group and T is a manifold (Text). G is also continuous and 
is a manifold just like space-time. Now think of a visual contour as a path-curve 
generated by the transformation group action, and choose some point on it.  Call 
this the identity element of the group.  Draw a tiny tangent line to the curve at 
that point.  This is the infinitesimal transformation of the continuous or Lie 
group. The infinitesimal transformation is embodied in a Lie derivative, which 
"drags the flow along the path-curve", the so-called "orbit"--in this case the 
visual contour of T.  If £ denotes the Lie derivative and f, the visual contour, 
then invariance of the contour under the transformation group is shown by its 
being annulled by the action of the Lie derivative:  £ f = 0, or by its being 
handed on as a "contact element" for further processing: £ f = g(f) .  These 
operations characterize psychological constancy.   
 
2) In addition, neurological processes are organized and sequenced through 
language; hence, language reflects the way each person perceives the world. 
Being a psycho-biological process, one could say that mental maps are a sort of 
biological path along which words travel. The mental representations of 
individuals depend on their experiences, culture, ideology and physiology, 
among other things. Language refers to the way individuals make use of verbal 
expression to communicate experience, and this is done with the structure 
implicit in their own language. 
 
Each of the substantive beliefs are propositions and these are formed by concepts. A 
concept is an analytical definition, an abstraction formed in the mind of a subject 
belonging to a particular semiotic system S.   The different schools of philosophy have 
different contradictory views on the epistemological meaning of the concept. Here, the 
concept is the main component of rational thought in the attempt to apprehend reality. 
The concept is the union of denotative and connotative significances (Usó-Doménech 
and, 2012; Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech, 2013a,b ). And the connotative 
significance of a concept is different according to the World vision of any particular 
belief system. And not only that, but within a World vision, each individual may have a 
different connotation of the concept itself. Within the three monotheistic religions 
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(Judaism, Christianity and Islam) the same concept of God has different connotations. 
For Judaism, God is the Absolute, is not represented and His Name is not known . 
YHVH, Adonai, HaShem, etc are just substitutes. And if He cannot be conceived in 
imagination, He can not be represented. Therefore, there is no religious art, as in the 
case of Christianity. And a narrow interpretation of the biblical words "man is made in 
the image and likeness of God" implies pictorial or sculptural human representation are 
wicked. Not until the nineteenth century do we find Jewish painters and sculptors. The 
case of Islam is not much different, although there are exceptions, such as the Iranian 
and Turkish miniatures, but in no case are there representations of divine characters as 
in the case of the Christian world where paintings, sculptures, etc., fill cathedrals, 
churches, monasteries, abbeys, museums. 
 
All human experiences, as well as their expression through language, are subject to 
processes that may constitute evidence of failures in the world of vision, failures in the 
form of omissions, distortions, and generalizations. According to Cobb (1997), every 
individual has a particular way of relating and ordering perceived sequences of events 
that is captured through his conversations. This is because human beings communicate 
through a narrative language that has a time, a space, and a logic for building 
relationships, all of which is reflected as coherence. In conversing, human beings 
express the manner in which they relate things, but also the manner in which they relate 
to one another. This is done through words that express meanings. 
In all materialization, human beings construct a sort of text T that may be understood as 
an analyzable object in which different structures may be identified, ranging from 
concrete organizations to abstract entities (Serrano, 2001). Meaning is built up through 
language; hence, the semantic value of the resulting text. Diverse orders exist:  
  
1) Positional order: In an effort to give meaning and significance to the texts, 
human beings apply a variety of organization strategies, assigning to structures 
defined as semantic units, a relational order. This order (De Erice, 2002), may be 
a positional order, where language alignment is mediated by space-time 
variables (syntagmatic order).  
 
2) Functional order, of codified association, since semantic units can only take on 
value related to others that may substitute it and constitute contextual 
relationships (paradigmatic order). There exists an ordering of text production 
and interpretation conditions in communication phenomena that goes beyond 
pragmatic factors to include situations of codified communication, inherited 
from culture, ideology and history.  
 
3) Referential order: There is also a referential order that determines the influence 
of the linguistic over the non-linguistic strata in practice. In this manner, the 
interpretive path of a text T entails a series of operations that allow us to assign 
one or more meanings or senses to a linguistic series.  
 
4) The hermeneutic order is the one guiding the production and interpretation of 
texts, that is to say, the one generating the content which is what has been 
defined as the text’s plan, made from the set of meanings. 
 
The interaction among different semantic units gives cohesion to a linguistic series, 
which is defined by its internal semantic relationships. However, the dynamic 
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interaction also defines a coherence mediated by the relationships it establishes with its 
environment.  
The specificity of a text T results from the intersection of a great number of structures 
which, when taken separately, are quite general. Nevertheless, experience shows that 
this is the point of view of the text, from a hermeneutic perspective, the one compelling 
the addition of contextual elements: without this, interpretation is incomplete and 
connotative comprehension unsatisfactory. In this manner the semantic process, the 
discourse, which is the set of codified linguistic uses together with a certain social 
practice – understood as the sphere of shared mental representations – defines a sort of 
associative network between units of meaning, which in their interactional dynamics 
define the context for reinterpreting the text T.  
A conceptual map is a graphic mental representation of a network of semantic units 
whose interactions define a context of meanings (denotations and connotations).  
The object of conceptual maps is to represent meaningful relationships between 
concepts in the form of propositions. A proposition consists of two or more concepts 
joined by linking words to form a semantic unit, that is, a unit with meaning. For Novak 
& Gowin (1984), a conceptual map “can provide a kind of visual road map showing 
some of the pathways we may take to connect meanings of concepts in propositions”. 
Several authors have stated that conceptual maps are networks of semantic 
relationships, where semantic refers to the meaning or interpretation of the meaning 
which individuals attribute to a given symbol, word, language or other formal 
representation.  It is during this negotiation (which may take place with others, but also 
with oneself), if done conscientiously, that individuals may come to recognize the 
generalizations, omissions, and distortions contained in their texts, and restructure their 
narratives. All modification of cognitive structure reports in the terminology of 
neurolinguistic theory, a new mental WV. This is the importance of conceptual maps. 
These theoretical arguments seem useful for analyzing and understanding results 
obtained by Miller and Cañas (2008), which indicate a relationship between the 
topological and semantic aspects of conceptual maps. The topological taxonomy 
classifies conceptual maps according to five criteria:  
 
1) Concept recognition.  
2) Presence of linking phrases. 
3) Degree of ramification. 
4) Depth.  
5) Presence of cross-links.  
 
These criteria consider progressively more complex topological entities, beginning with 
concepts, passing through propositions, beliefs, etc. and ending with a complete 
conceptual map (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4: The conceptual map. 
 
The mechanism is the following one: 
 
1) Once beliefs (nodes) have been placed in a map, they are related to one another 
to form larger graphic structures by means of any form of symbolic 
representation – this is the linking phrase.  
 
2) Ramification occurs when several relationships emanate from the same node or 
make use of the same linking element.  
 
3) Hierarchical depth refers to the number of levels of beliefs nested under the root 
(main) concept of the map.  
 
Though this nesting may indeed be evidence of conceptual subsumption, the two are not 
to be confused; this topological criterion considers only the number of the level, not 
what concepts are placed in each of them. The last criterion deals with cross-links. From 
the perspective of spatial organization, cross-links, when accompanied by all the other 
elements mentioned above, lead to topological entities of greater overall complexity. 
Therefore, this would appear to be a semantic criterion. However, the ability to 
recognize individual concepts and beliefs is so basic to being able to build up rich, 
interconnected, flexible conceptual map topologies that this criterion is included among 
the structural criteria. In other words, the focus is not on what is actually said, but on 
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whether the mapper is able to recognize beliefs in their original context and depict the 
way in which they are related to one another.  
As Novak & Gowin (1984) have noted, “Conceptual mapping has been developed 
specifically to tap into a learner’s cognitive structure and to externalize...what the 
learner already knows”. Although conceptual maps certainly do not provide a 
“complete representation of the relevant concepts and propositions a learner knows... 
[they do constitute] a workable approximation”. This is the main argument that shows 
the relationship between topology and semantics, between graphical configuration and 
meaning and it implies a dynamic relationship between the topological and semantic 
aspects of conceptual maps, where the former may be conceived as the dependent 
variable, and the latter as the independent one. Being a dynamic interaction, in giving 
expression to a text in a conceptual map the dependent variable helps to reorganize the 
independent variable. 
This would explain why it is stated that there are no good or bad conceptual maps; it is 
the reason why it is said that the conceptual map represents the state of a subject’s 
knowledge on the topic at a given moment. The topological-semantic relationship 
would seem to be led by semantics. In other words, changes on the semantic front give 
rise to changes on the topological front. Changes in topology however have little 
influence upon semantics, but do offer important information that can provide feedback 
to the subject to help produce changes in his cognitive structure, that is, to learn in a 
meaningful way. 
From the viewpoint of the neurolinguistic model, each person is said to have a mental 
world vision WV in which his life unfolds. This representation is called the individual’s 
mental world vision (MWV), which in turn becomes expressed through texts T.  
The conceptual map is a text representing meanings, is a reflection of the person’s 
connotation, of the way the person communicates with himself and with others.  
When that communication is to be represented graphically through a conceptual map, its 
physical layout or configuration reflects the way he or she arranges sequences of 
relationships makes differentiations and identifies or discovers integrations, all of which 
serve to construct meanings. However, this spatial aspect of a conceptual map depends 
on the content with which the subject interprets the world and its relationships. 
Neurolinguistics, from its practical approach states that by generating changes in an 
individual’s language, changes in his mental model can be achieved and a new model 
will generate new behaviours.  
In the learning process if a change in the cognitive structure occurs, with new words, 
new symbols, new beliefs and new representations, with the intention of obtaining new 
meanings within that frameset, the consequence will be a shift in individuals’ emotional 
state, responses and behaviours. 
Human beings utilize certain cognitive strategies to integrate coherence and cohesion 
into meanings. These information organization strategies are generalizations, distortion 
and elimination of data. For this reason, neurolinguistic theory (Nescolarde-Selva and 
Usó-Domènech. 2013c) considers it indispensable that individuals acquire the ability to 
recognize their generalizations, to recover the parts omitted from their model of the 
world, and to correct its distortions, in order to guide in a precise way the process of 
shifting their mental models. In that new context, mediated by new communications, 
underlying mental models are modified, and consequently changes are produced in 
semantic processes. This requires a new organization, which shows up in a conceptual 
map as changes in topological structure. As a consequence, we establish the following 
hypothesis: Changes in the semantic structure of a conceptual map generate changes in 
the topological structure. 
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